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At first sight, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) seems to be a least likely candidate 
for a regional organization (RO) prescribing and promoting (good) governance in its 
member states: It consists of authoritarian monarchies and is a strong proponent of the 
principles of national sovereignty and non-interference. This paper, however, shows 
that the GCC does engage in governance transfer. Reacting to a crisis of legitimacy, 
the rulers of the GCC states have resorted to governance transfer as a strategy of legit-
imation. In certain policy fields they prescribe and promote good governance standards 
to suggest to their respective citizenry as well as to external investors that they are 
actively trying to tackle their governance problems in these fields. Governance transfer 
by the GCC can be conceptualized as an institutional choice by the rulers of the GCC 





   
Vorwort / Foreword 
Tanja A. Börzel 
 
Dieses Berliner Arbeitspapier zur Europäischen Integration ist eines von dreien, die  
auf der Grundlage von herausragenden Projektkurs-Arbeiten zum Governance-
Transfer von Regionalorganisation entstanden sind. Der Projektkurs „Governance 
Transfer by Regional Organizations“ fand im Wintersemester 2011/2012 und im Som-
mersemester 2012 unter  der Leitung von Tanja A. Börzel und Vera van Hüllen am 
Otto-Suhr-Institut für Politikwissenschaft statt. Unter Rückgriff auf den gemeinsam ent-
wickelten konzeptionellen Rahmen leisten Maria Haimerl (Golf-Kooperationsrat), Se-
bastian Schneider (Shanghaier Organisation für Zusammenarbeit) und Lena Wegener 
(Mercosur) einen Beitrag zur Vergleichenden Regionalismusforschung. Diese For-
schungsagenda hat in den letzten Jahren auch im Umfeld des Jean Monnet Lehrstuhls 
und der Arbeitsstelle Europäische Integration an Bedeutung gewonnen und weist mit 
ihrem vergleichenden Blick auf regionale Integration weltweit über unsere Erfahrungen 
mit Europa und der Europäischen Union hinaus. Die drei Arbeiten beleuchten aus un-
terschiedlicher Perspektive, inwieweit Standardsetzung im Bereich von (Good) 
Governance auf regionaler Ebene von den Mitgliedstaaten zur Legitimierung ihrer (au-
toritären) Regime oder auch der Regionalorganisation selbst eingesetzt wird. 
 
This is one of three Berlin Working Papers on European Integration that are based on 
excellent term papers investigating governance transfer by regional organizations. Ma-
ria Haimerl (Gulf Cooperation Council), Sebastian Schneider (Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization), and Lena Wegener (Mercosur) conducted their research during a one-
year course at the Otto Suhr Institute for Political Science under the supervision of Tan-
ja A. Börzel and Vera van Hüllen. Drawing on a jointly developed analytical framework, 
they all contribute to the current research agenda of comparative regionalism which 
has gained prominence over the past few years. It has also taken root in the context of 
the Jean Monnet Chair and the Centre for European Integration, challenging students 
of regional integration to go beyond our experiences with Europe and the European 
Union. The three papers investigate in how far member states use the reference to 
(good) governance standards at the regional level as a strategy of legitimation for their
(authoritarian) regimes or the regional organizations themselves.
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1. Introduction 
 
Since the 1990s in particular, regional organizations (ROs) have started to prescribe 
and promote standards for legitimate governance institutions1 in their member states. 
In their founding treaties and political declarations many ROs have included a commit-
ment to democracy or human rights, they have developed suspension clauses for the 
protection of democracy and human rights or have defined the respect of common val-
ues as precondition for membership in their organizations (Börzel et al. 2013: 9-11). 
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which was founded by the six gulf monarchies2 
Oman, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar in Abu 
Dhabi in 1981, can be considered as a least likely candidate for governance transfer. 
First, all of its member states are authoritarian monarchies (Lucas 2004: 103). In the 
Supreme Council Meetings the rulers congratulate each other to their anniversaries of 
ruling:  
 
„Their Majesties and Royal Highnesses […] expressed their sincere congratula-
tions to the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques King Fahd bin Abdul Aziz Al-
Saud, King of Saudi Arabia on the occasion of completion of 20 years of his 
rule” (GCC 2001a). 
 
Well illustrated by this quote, the GCC can be defined as guardian of the traditional 
forces of the region (Richter 2011: 5). This characteristic has inter alia recently been 
confirmed by the intervention of the GCC “Peninsula Shield Force“ (forces from Saudi 
Arabia and UAE) in Bahrain to suppress an uprising against the ruling family (Tétreault 
2011: 632) and the invitation to the monarchies Jordan and Morocco to join the “club of 
monarchies“ (Colombo 2012: 10). Second, together with the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the League of Arab States (LAS), the GCC can be consid-
ered as one of the strongest proponents of the principles of national sovereignty and 
non-interference, rejecting interference in internal affairs (GCC 2009: 13). Finally, the 
                                               
 
1
  Governance institutions are defined as “norms, rules, and procedures that are the basis for the provi-
sion of collective goods and collectively binding rules (what), defining the who (governance actors: 
state and non-state), how (modes of social coordination: hierarchical and non-hierarchical), and for 
whom (governance collective) of governance” (Beisheim et al. 2011). 
2
  Formally, only five out of the six states are monarchies. The UAE are a federation of seven emirates. 
However, to define it as a “republic” would be a fallacy, as the competences are exclusively diffused 
among the seven dynasties (Schmidmayr 2010: 66). Therefore, all of the GCC countries will be de-
fined as monarchies. 
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GCC remains a “loose framework” (Solingen 2009: 38). The GCC bodies do not pos-
sess supranational powers and decision-making procedures “generally reflect those of 
the six national governments in their opaque and informal nature” (Legrenzi 2008: 112). 
Considering these characteristics by the GCC, one would expect that the organization 
does not engage in governance transfer. Indeed, analyzing basic documents like the 
GCC’s founding charter (1981) or political declarations by the Supreme Council, there 
are no instances in which the GCC demands or promotes the building or modification 
of its member states’ governance institutions with reference to the concepts of human 
rights, democracy or rule of law. Nevertheless, in this paper I claim that the GCC does 
engage in governance transfer: Having a closer look at different policy fields, it be-
comes obvious that the GCC actually demands and promotes the building and modifi-
cation of its member states’ governance institutions, the concept of good governance 
being the point of reference.3 Starting from this initial empirical observation, this paper 
seeks to elucidate under which conditions the GCC has started to engage in govern-
ance transfer and how it exactly engages in governance transfer – which policy fields it 
engages in, which standards it promotes and which instruments it applies. The period 
of analysis will encompass the time between 1981 and 2011.  
The paper proceeds in six steps: First, I will review the state of research and conceptu-
alize governance transfer as a strategy of legitimation by the authoritarian rulers of the 
Gulf states. Second, the methodology will be clarified. Subsequently, I will map and 
discuss governance transfer by the GCC. In the conclusion, I will be point out which 
lessons can be drawn from the results about governance transfer by ROs of authoritar-
ian regimes in general and how the findings of this paper relate to findings about gov-
ernance transfer of other ROs. 
 
 
2. Strategies of Legitimation and the GCC 
 
In order to find an answer to the question under which conditions and how the GCC 
engages in governance transfer, two strands of literature have to be reconsidered. 
First, I review works on authoritarian regimes and what they can tell us about the condi-
tions under which authoritarian regimes resort to governance reforms as strategies of 
                                               
 
3
  By the term good governance I refer to a narrow conceptualization, which is comparable to the con-
cept as originally proposed by the World Bank and focuses on strengthening the output legitimacy of 
governance institutions (Börzel et al. 2011: 7). 
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legitimation. This literature also points out how authoritarian regimes pursue these re-
forms. Thereby, I will mainly focus on the literature about the Gulf countries. In the se-
cond part of this chapter I will review the literature on regionalism and regional cooper-
ation in the Gulf. Under which conditions did the GCC states start to cooperate? What 
have been the driving forces and characteristics of the authoritarian regimes’ regional 
cooperation?  In the third part I will draw on these findings in order to conceptualize 
governance transfer as a strategy of legitimation. 
 
2.1. Strategies of Legitimation by Authoritarian Regimes 
 
Any authoritarian regime – as any other political regime – needs to create and maintain 
legitimacy in order to survive over time (Murphy 1998: 72; Schlumberger 2010: 233; 
Bank 2004: 157). In addition to repression and institutional cooptation, strategies of 
legitimation4 are seen as an important explanatory factor of the stability5 of authoritari-
an regimes (Gerschewski 2010: 47). The importance of legitimacy and the rulers’ dif-
ferent strategies of legitimation have been examined in many works on authoritarian 
regimes (for example Bank 2004; Al-Rasheed 2009; Yamani 2009). As Murphy elabo-
rates, “in times of crisis the need to establish the legitimacy of both the ruling elites and 
the political system itself becomes all more important” (1998: 72). In these times of 
crisis of legitimacy, authoritarian regimes often resort to economic and/or political gov-
ernance reforms in order to re-establish or regain legitimacy. When pursuing strategies 
of legitimation, rulers usually address different audiences: they can target the citizenry 
at large, elites or certain social groups as well as different international and external 
actors (Bank 2004: 160; Schlumberger 2010: 236-237). 
Referring to the question of how they usually pursue these strategies, authors speak of 
“survival strategies”, a term coined by Brumberg (1995): “These survival strategies es-
sentially consist of initiating only minimal, and sometimes simply contrived, reforms in 
the economic and political fields that do not touch upon vested interests and that leave 
the political status quo largely intact” (Bank 2004: 158f). Thus, the term “survival strat-
                                               
 
4
  Barker conceptualizes legitimation as “[…] an active, contested political process, rather than legitimacy 
as an abstract political resource. Since it is an activity, not a property, it involves creation, modification, 
innovation, and transformation” (2001: 28). 
5
  In the 1990s the research on authoritarian regimes has mainly focused on the potential for democratic 
transitions. In the 2000s the research´s focus has shifted towards the perceived stability of authoritari-
an regimes (literature reviews by Bank 2009; Kailitz 2009a; Köllner 2008). Many assumptions of this 
research have been criticized in view of the Arab uprisings of 2011, for example Harders (2011: 11). 
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egy” emphasizes that the interest of authoritarian rulers in solving the problems which 
have caused the crisis of legitimacy is compromised by the wish not to endanger their 
own position of power. 
Examining authoritarian legitimacy in the Arab Middle East, Schlumberger claims that 
traditional, material, ideological and religious legitimacy are the “four key pillars” on 
which the non-repressive survival strategies of Arab autocracies have rested over the 
past decades (2010: 246). As for the Gulf states, authors define three main sources of 
legitimacy: traditional, religious and material legitimacy (Weiffen 2008: 2588; Al-
brecht/Schlumberger 2004: 377). Thereby, material legitimacy, which equates to output 
legitimacy6, is considered to be “the cornerstone of these regimes’ legitimacy and via-
bility” (Solingen 2009: 3; also Gray 2011: 32). The 1990s have been a time of a crisis of 
legitimacy for the Gulf states, inducing the rulers to engage in reforms. This crisis has 
primarily originated from economic problems associated with population growth, eco-
nomic mismanagement and world economic conditions such as the fluctuation of oil 
prices (Najem 2003: 14).  
The respective conceptual literature dealing with material legitimacy is the “rentier state 
approach”. Its most basic assumption is that, since a state receives external income in 
form of oil rents and distributes it to society in form of welfare benefits, it is relieved of 
having to impose taxation, meaning that it does not have to offer concessions to socie-
ty such as a democratic bargain (Wiese 2012: 213). The assumption of a “ruling bar-
gain” (Wiese 2012: 213) or “national contract” (Etheshami 2003: 60) rests on this prac-
tice. In how far this “ruling bargain” meets actual consent by the population is difficult to 
ascertain (Wiese 2012: 213) and the approach has been criticized on many accounts.7 
Either way, one can argue that the effectiveness in a mainly economic sense or the 
output of the system are a central pillar for the legitimacy as they are the basis for the 
functioning of the “contract” between the rulers and the ruled. If the effectiveness of the 
regime is compromised this can have serious consequences for the perceived legiti-
macy among the population. 
                                               
 
6
 Output legitimacy “refers to the extent to which the effects of political decisions are perceived to be in the 
interest of the people. In this view, good governance is about solving societal problems in an effective 
and efficient manner” (Börzel 2009). Input legitimacy “(…) requires political decisions to correspond to 
the preferences of affected people. (...) good governance must ensure that the preferences of the 
people are translated into political decisions” (Börzel 2009).  
7
 It is inter alia questioned that a rentier economy automatically depoliticizes the population (Mitchell 2010: 
279; Tétreault 2011: 631). Gause argues that depoliticizing effects are real, but are only seen at the 
beginning stages of rentier state development (1994: 81). Gray stresses that rentierism has to be seen 
through a dynamic lens, taking into consideration changing socioeconomic demands by the population 
(2011: 23). 
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In the Gulf states, the economic problems of the 1990s limited the ability of these 
states to fulfill their “national contract” as they made financial cuts in social services 
and the introduction of taxes necessary (Schmidmayr 2010: 69; Etheshami 2003: 60). 
This resulted in protests and the rise of mainly Islamist oppositional forces, especially 
in Bahrain and Saudi-Arabia – challenging the legitimacy of the incumbent regimes 
(Najem 2003: 14). Due to grave economic difficulties and social tensions, the rulers 
had to consider the introduction of economic and political reforms (Etheshami 2003: 
54). Thereby, they mainly addressed their citizenry. However, while this crisis of legiti-
macy found its expression in internal instability (protests, uprisings), it also resulted in 
external consequences: The Gulf states were (different to most other Arab states) not 
dependent on the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) or other aid do-
nors. Yet, they were (and are) heavily dependent on international trade,8 especially in 
the face of declining oil rents (Najem 2003: 14). As Solingen suggests, the regimes’ 
need for economic prosperity as the cornerstone of their legitimacy requires inter alia 
capital, investments and domestic stability (2009: 3). Therefore, with the reforms they 
also aimed at international actors (mainly foreign investors), conveying the impression 
that they were actively trying to get out of economic and political crises. 
With regard to the content of reforms, the rulers were referring to “internationally rec-
ognized ‘indicators’ associated with ‘good’ governance, including transparency, ac-
countability, absence of corruption […]” (Etheshami 2003: 55; also Najem 2003: 
14).9However, with the exception of Kuwait, reforms in the Gulf countries were widely 
characterized as “survival strategies”: “[…] we see less substantial meaning to these 
reforms and more superficial manipulation of democratic symbols meant to appease 
domestic demand and appeal to the international mindset” (Mitchell 2010: 277; also 
Weiffen 2008: 2597; Schmidmayr 2010: 72).  
The literature offers important insights under which conditions and how authoritarian 
rulers in general and the Gulf rulers in particular have resorted to strategies of legitima-
tion which mostly take the form of “survival strategies”. Yet, the authors exclusively 
focus on the national level, when analyzing the Gulf countries’ reforms in the 1990s 
(Weiffen 2008; Mitchell 2010; Schmidmayr 2010). The regional level and the GCC are 
not taken into consideration. This is quite surprising, as the GCC should be understood 
                                               
 
8
 Bahrain and Kuwait have become members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, 
the UAE and Qatar in 1996, Oman in 2000 and Saudi-Arabia in 2005 
(http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm; last access 21.3.2013). 
9
 Due to the limited scope of this paper the reforms taken in the countries cannot be analyzed in detail (see 
for example Etheshami/Wright 2007; Niethammer 2008; Quilliam 2003; Tétreault et al. 2011). 
   10 
as a “source of collective legitimisation for the traditional monarchies of the Gulf” (Bel-
lamy 2004: 122).10 
 
2.2. The GCC as Source of Collective Legitimation 
 
There are different explanatory approaches for the foundation of the GCC (Lawson 
1999: 7-15). Neo-realist approaches emphasize manifold security threats like the Is-
lamic revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraq war. It is 
argued that the GCC has to be understood as an alliance which has been founded to 
re-establish the balance of power towards Iran (Gariup 2008: 81). In earlier works au-
thors interpret the GCC’s foundation as “natural” consequence of perceived social, cul-
tural, political and religious commonalities, thereby rendering the GCC’s official dis-
course (Braibanti 1987: 205, cited in Holthaus 2010: 32). However, most authors em-
phasize that the GCC rulers perceived regional cooperation as a useful means for cop-
ing with their domestic challenges, countering common threats to internal security 
(Acharya 1992: 149; Holthaus 2010: 37). Growth trends in the economy, technology 
and urban lifestyles, reflecting the impact of modernization, and the infusion of oil reve-
nues to the Gulf states following the global oil crisis of the early 1970s resulted in an 
erosion of central traditional values – “Islam, tribe and extended family” (Acharya 1992: 
154) – at the end of the 1970s. Communist, radical nationalist and Islamic fundamen-
talist opposition movements arose, challenging the conservative Gulf regimes (Acharya 
1992: 154). By the time of these developments, the Iranian revolution took place in 
1979. The problems with oppositional movements influenced the perception of the 
events in Iran: The revolution was not seen as a military threat but its political and ideo-
logical implications caused disquiet and alarm, especially among the Saudis (Acharya 
1992: 156). These fears were largely confirmed by the Khomeini regime: it did not only 
criticize the Gulf monarchies’ pro-western foreign policy, but also questioned the legiti-
macy of their ruling and its religious and traditional justification (Holthaus 2010: 35). 
Iran even directly intervened in the domestic affairs of the smaller Gulf states by exac-
erbating Shi’a unrest and potential uprisings (Solingen 2009: 35; Holthaus 2010: 36). 
These events induced the rulers to react to their shared problems at home by starting 
to cooperate at a regional level. Their shared concerns were reflected in the GCC’s 
                                               
 
10
  Bellamy applies the word “legitimisation”, in this paper the term “legitimation” is used. No differences in 
meaning exist among them. 
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agenda: Even though it did not state it in its founding treaties, internal security coopera-
tion was the main concern of the regimes (Abdulla 1999: 157). Behind a “façade of 
economic cooperation” (Solingen 2009: 36), they mainly cooperated on security and 
intelligence matters to deal with domestic subversive forces (Solingen 2009: 36).  
Turning to the driving force behind cooperation, most authors argue that economic in-
tegration has gained importance since the 1990s (Richter 2011). Solingen stresses that 
the rulers have shared an interest in maximizing access to global markets, capital and 
investments, as well as political and economic, domestic and regional stability. These 
interests are related to the need to ensure their regimes’ economic prosperity as the 
basis of their regimes’ legitimacy and have therefore apparently “overwhelmed other 
competitive drives, for the most part and have resulted in cooperation between the 
states” (Solingen 2009: 1). As mentioned in the introduction, the rulers congratulate 
each other to their anniversaries of ruling and express their solidarity with each other 
whenever uprisings take place, denouncing them collectively as “terrorist activities” 
(Holthaus 2010: 92). Beyond this rhetorical support, they even assist each other in 
suppressing internal upheavals, as recently illustrated in Bahrain (Tétreault 2011: 632). 
However, cooperation among the Gulf states faces many obstacles. Most studies point 
to the dramatic gap between the Charter and the actual operation of the GCC (Alasfoor 
2007; Legrenzi 2008). Intra-regional tensions over territorial issues have existed since 
the beginning (Solingen 2009: 38). As pointed out in the introduction, the regimes fear 
to give up sovereignty, resulting in institutional structures which do not foresee any 
autonomy for the Secretary General or any other GCC body. This finds its expression 
in informal decision-making procedures (Legrenzi 2008: 112). Illustrative for this is a 
quote by former Secretary General Abdullah Bishara: “Rules are there to serve a pur-
pose. If a particular purpose is better served by ignoring the rules [of the GCC] they will 
be ignored” (Bishara, November 2000, cited in Legrenzi 2011: 27).  
In conclusion, Bellamy’s analysis that the GCC as a “source of collective legitimisation” 
(2004: 122) for the monarchies of the Gulf is not only confirmed when analyzing the 
background of the foundation and the driving force behind cooperation, but also when 
looking at current rhetoric and practices by the ruling elites.  
 
2.3. Governance Transfer as Strategy of Legitimation 
 
Reconsidering the state of research, a crisis of legitimacy has been defined as key 
condition under which authoritarian regimes resort to strategies of legitimation. In the 
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case of the Gulf states, these strategies have taken the form of economic and/or politi-
cal governance reforms. Furthermore, the state of research suggests, that the Gulf 
states have pursued a regional strategy whenever the perception of a crisis of legitima-
cy or interests have been shared. The crisis of legitimacy has, on the one hand, direct 
implications at the national level, as protests and oppositional forces might arise which 
directly endanger the regimes’ stability. On the other hand, this internal instability has 
also effects on the way how the countries are perceived by external actors. If the coun-
tries are not perceived as being stable, this will have consequences: As Solingen has 
pointed out, domestic and regional stability are essential to attract investors. Benefits of 
Foreign Direct Investments (FDIs) are inter alia attracting capital, technology, increas-
ing employment and increasing balance of payments (Samimi et al. 2011: 18). Thus, 
they are important for the regimes’ economic prosperity which is the cornerstone of 
their legitimacy. Therefore, resorting to governance transfer as a regional strategy of 
legitimation, rulers not only address their citizenry, but also international actors and 
mainly international investors.  
These assumptions are also confirmed in the literature about other ROs. There is a 
growing body of research on the role of regional organizations for democracy and hu-
man rights at the national level. It is argued that states use regional organizations to 
“lock-in” democratic developments (Pevehouse 2005). Using ROs to lock-in domestic 
institutions does not only work for democratizing states. Authoritarian governments 
have instrumentalized their membership in the Organization of American States (OAS) 
and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to bolster the sover-
eignty and legitimacy of their regimes (Levitsky/Way 2010: 363-364; Söderbaum 2004, 
cited in Börzel et al. 2013: 24). In the course of governance transfer, regional organiza-
tions define what governance should look like at the national level in order to be legiti-
mate (Börzel et al. 2013: 7). The Gulf states’ rulers have not ceded any national sover-
eignty to the GCC. Therefore, I assume that it is mainly the rulers’ view and what they 
perceive as suitable standards for governance institutions. This does, however, not 
preclude that they resort to concepts or discourses discussed at an international level. 
Taking the findings about other ROs and the findings about the GCC states into con-
sideration, governance transfer is here conceptualized as an institutional choice by 
authoritarian rulers (Koremenos et al. 2001, cited in Börzel et al. 2013: 23). It is as-
sumed that the crisis of legitimacy has created a demand for governance transfer: In 
order to bolster their legitimacy towards their citizenry and as a signaling mechanism 
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by committing themselves to certain standards external donors or investors care about, 
the GCC rulers have included good governance standards in certain policy fields as a 
strategy of legitimation. Thereby, the authoritarian regime type of the Gulf states (Lucas 
2004; Freedom House 2012) influences the way how the GCC states engage in gov-
ernance transfer. As the reviewed literature suggests, the interests of authoritarian rul-
ers in solving the problems which have caused the crisis of legitimacy is compromised 
by the wish not to endanger their own position of power. Thus, it can be expected that 
governance transfer as a strategy of legitimation will take the shape of a “survival strat-
egy”. 
A crisis of legitimacy is one central condition under which authoritarian regimes resort 
to strategies of legitimation. Authoritarian regimes pursue a regional strategy when the 
perception of a crisis of legitimacy is shared among the rulers. Depending on which 
“main” source of legitimacy their authoritarian rule rests, an erosion of this specific 
source of legitimacy can be defined as an important condition under which regimes 
resort to strategies of legitimation. As material or output legitimacy is defined as the 
“cornerstone” of the Gulf regimes’ legitimacy (Solingen 2009: 3; Wiese 2012: 213), it 
can be assumed that an erosion of the regimes’ economic prosperity will have serious 




If authoritarian regimes – cooperating in a RO – are facing a shared “crisis of 
legitimacy” (with regards to their “main” source of legitimacy) they resort to gov-
ernance transfer as a strategy of legitimation. 
 
A crisis of legitimacy has internal and external consequences: Internal instability is an 
immediate threat to the regime, as protests and oppositional movements directly chal-
lenge the regimes’ claim to power. At the same time, it also has external consequences 
for the reputation of the regime, as stability is needed in order to attract international 
investors and ensure economic prosperity. Thus, rulers will engage in governance 
transfer in respective policy fields in which a lack of effectiveness and capability of the 
political and economic system has become most apparent, trying to convey the im-
pression to both internal as well as external actors that they are actually trying to deal 
with the causes of the crisis. However, due to their authoritarian regime type, it can be 
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assumed that governance transfer will not take place in areas which are closely asso-
ciated with their sovereignty or the interests of the ruling families. 
 
Hypothesis 2:  
If authoritarian regimes – cooperating in a RO – are facing a crisis of legitimacy, 
they engage in those areas in which they can convey the impression to the tar-
geted audience that they are actually trying to solve the crisis, without endan-
gering the political status quo and vested interests of the ruling families. 
 
With regard to the content of governance transfer or the precise standards for domestic 
governance institutions, the rulers will also address the two audiences. As the crisis is 
one of a lack of effectiveness and capability of the political and economic system, it is 
likely that the regimes will pursue standards which are internationally associated with 
the improvement of governance (Etheshami 2003: 55). Therefore, they will focus on 
reforms of good governance to suggest to the public and external actors that they are 
trying to solve their problems of ineffective governance. However, due to their authori-
tarian regime type, it is assumed that no norms will be pursued which would touch 
vested interests or which would change the political status quo. Therefore, it can be 
assumed that the norms promoted will be output-oriented, as input-oriented reforms 
would potentially change political power structures. 
 
Hypothesis 3:  
If ROs – consisting of authoritarian regimes – engage in governance transfer, 
then they demand “output-oriented” standards of “good governance”.  
 
As the rulers want to convey the impression that they are responsive to the causes of 
the crisis of legitimacy, but are at the same time concerned about their own interests 
and power, it is likely that the GCC mainly engages in the prescription of governance 
standards but less in their promotion. If standards are actually promoted, it is likely that 
the instruments applied will be “soft” instruments, not interfering with the sovereignty of 
the authoritarian regimes of the Gulf. “Soft” instruments are instruments such as dia-




   15 
Hypothesis 4:  
If ROs – consisting of authoritarian regimes – engage in governance transfer, 
they mainly engage in the prescription of standards. If they promote standards, 





All documents available on the English homepage of the GCC, covering the period 
from 1981 until 2011, have been analyzed. Taking the basic definition for governance 
transfer as a starting point, all available documents have been screened for instances 
of governance transfer. As a result of this screening process, instances of governance 
transfer have been found in the policy areas of education, population/employment and 
environment. The governance standards which have been found are: efficiency, effec-
tiveness, transparency and accountability, which are core norms of good governance11 
(Börzel et al. 2011: 7). After the first screening process two other basic standards have 
been added, which appear to be important in the context of the GCC: sustainability and 
juridification. 
Sustainability has been added, as the GCC mentions this term in many instances and 
as the GCC’s understanding of sustainability exceeds the normative standards of effec-
tiveness, efficiency, accountability and transparency. The first and most important defi-
nition for sustainability or sustainable development was given by the United Nations in 
1987. Sustainable development was defined as “development that meets the needs of 
the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own 
needs” (United Nations 1987: unpaginated). The GCC’s definition of sustainable devel-
opment builds on the principle  
 
“that the outcome of human interaction with the existing resources as well as 
prevailing conditions cause constant advancement of society and increases the 
efficient use of human, material and technological resources” (GCC 2011: 18). 
                                               
 
11
  Good governance as a concept originated in a World Bank report of 1989 (Najem 2003: 1). As Börzel 
et al. suggest, there are two main approaches with regards to GG: The first approach corresponds 
with the output dimension and focuses on strengthening the output legitimacy of institutions: “GG re-
fers to an administrative core with the proper functioning of the state administration at its centre” 
(2011: 7). The second approach focuses on strengthening the input legitimacy of governance institu-
tions. As stated in the introduction, I focus on the first approach, a rather narrow perspective compa-
rable to the concept offered by the World Bank. 
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This concept exceeds the rather environment-centered approach by the United Nations 
regarding its objectives which are among others: the optimal utilization of available re-
sources, enhancing understanding of the modern functions of government, participation 
of all community institutions in the development process, activating market forces, eco-
nomic reform and combating financial and administrative corruption (GCC 2011:19). 
Also the standard of “juridification” (Blichner/Molander 2005) has to be taken into con-
sideration: In many instances, the GCC is very insistent about the member states fol-
lowing certain rules or standards, without specifying its exact contents. In its docu-
ments, the GCC demands the regulation of activities by certain norms, rules, laws or 
standards, without further specification of their contents. This equates in principle one 
central dimension of “juridification”12 (Blichner/Molander 2005: 12). I want to stress the 
fact, that the GCC does not specify any content in most cases, its demands are limited 
to the most formal elements and it does not prescribe any objectives relating to state 
organization, promulgation, law enforcement or the like as the rule of law concept as 
defined by Börzel et al. suggest (2011: 8). I argue that these two added analytical cate-
gories can be subsumed under the concept of good governance. There is necessarily 
some overlap between the different standards. This poses no problem, as objectives of 
governance transfer usually address more than one norm (Börzel et al. 2011: 7). 
For an operationalization of these normative standards, the definitions have been taken 
as a basis and “key words” within these definitions have been identified, which can be 
a reference to the respective standard. With the help of a thesaurus, synonyms for the-
se key words, which can be an indicator for the normative standards as well, have 
been added. Additionally, the found objectives have been matched with the basic defi-
nitions of the normative standards and of governance transfer to ensure that the re-
spective standard actually qualifies as an instance of governance transfer. Subse-
quently, all the respective documents of all policy fields have been screened for the 
normative standards and it has been examined whether normative standards for legiti-
mate governance institutions are prescribed in the respective policy field or not.  
Standards are – potentially – not only prescribed, but also promoted (Börzel et al. 
2011: 11-12). Therefore, other dimensions of governance transfer have been consid-
ered, after prescribed standards have been identified. Promotion can be sub-divided 
into policy, adoption and application. Hence, in the analysis of the documents it has 
                                               
 
12
  Blichner/Molander differentiate among five dimensions of “juridification”. One of them is defined as “a 
process through which law comes to regulate an increasing number of different activities” (2005: 5). 
For the other dimensions of juridification see Blichner/Molander 2005. 
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been examined whether the RO has specified strategic guidelines and has formally 
adopted measures as well as applied these measures. 
Also the instruments with which the RO seeks to induce compliance have to be ana-
lyzed. Börzel et al. (2011) distinguish among four different instruments or mechanisms: 
litigation and military force (coercion), sanctions and rewards (incentives), assistance 
(capacity‐building), dialogue and exchange (persuasion and socialization). To examine 
the instruments, guiding questions on basis of Börzel et al.’s description of potential 
instruments have been developed (Börzel et al. 2011). The instruments have been 
analyzed for the different dimensions of governance transfer. Next to the available 
documents, reports, interviews etc. and the homepages of national institu-
tions/ministries and online media have been analyzed in order to find out whether the 
RO has actually promoted its prescribed standards and which instruments it has ap-
plied. 
As Schlumberger points out, legitimacy is not only hard to define but also to operation-
alize (2010: 234): In general, research on legitimacy of regimes/political systems 
among the population13 draws on survey results or opinion polls as relevant sources 
(Pickel/Pickel 2006: 29-47).14 In authoritarian regimes, these methods are not applica-
ble due to a lack of independent surveys, opinion polls and free media (Bank 2004: 
158). Therefore, one needs other indicators for a crisis of legitimacy. Indicators for a 
crisis of legitimacy in general are: different forms of protests, riots or the rise of opposi-
tional forces, questioning the legitimacy of the ruling regimes. It is important to consider 
that these expressions of discontent as indicators for a crisis of legitimacy are seriously 
restricted under authoritarian regimes, due to extensive coercive apparatuses (Bellin 
2004). If protests take place, the substantive demands as well as the criticism of the 
oppositional forces can indicate which source of legitimacy has eroded. 
Authors define the Gulf states as monarchies whose rule is based on three main 
sources of legitimacy: tradition, religion and material or output legitimacy (Weiffen 
2008: 2588; Albrecht/Schlumberger 2004: 377). Thereby, “output legitimacy” is inter-
preted as the “cornerstone” of the Gulf regimes’ legitimacy (Solingen 2009: 3; Wiese 
2012: 213; Gray 2011: 32).  
                                               
 
13
  Referring to an empirical understanding of legitimacy (in contrast to a normative understanding) as 
represented by Max Weber´s re-definition of legitimacy as belief in legitimacy (Schlumberger 2010: 
235). 
14
  These surveys are, however, also afflicted with many methodological problems and challenges 
(Pickel/Pickel 2006: 29-47; Schlumberger 2010: 35-36). 
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Apart from demands of the protesting population postulated during protests, indicators 
for a crisis of “material” or “output legitimacy” are: declining rents and consequences 
which can be felt by the citizens such as the introduction of taxes, declining subsidies, 
cuts in social services, job cuts in the public sector, as they indicate that the rulers do 
not fulfill their “side” of the “authoritarian contract”. Next to these factors indicating a 
crisis of legitimacy at the national level, the reflection of this crisis at the international 
level can be seen inter alia when having a look at the amount of FDI. A decline of FDI 




4. Governance Transfer by the GCC in Different Policy Fields 
4.1.  A Crisis of Legitimacy in the 1990s 
 
For the Gulf states, the 1990s were characterized by declining rents, resulting in in-
creasing fiscal pressure (Najem 2003: 12). These developments limited the ability of 
the states to fulfill their “authoritarian contract” as it made financial cuts in social ser-
vices and the introduction of taxes necessary (Schmidmayr 2010: 69). Adding to these 
financial problems, the countries faced increasing population pressure and unemploy-
ment, especially among the youth (Najem 2003: 12). Insufficiencies of the education 
system were often criticized by the private sector, which showed reluctance to hire na-
tionals as opposed to cheaper migrants, thereby contributing to the high levels of youth 
unemployment. At the same time, there were great numbers of foreign employees: In 
the 1990s foreign workers accounted for 50 percent of the national workforce in Bah-
rain, 70 percent in Oman, and 80 and 92 percent in Saudi Arabia and Qatar respective-
ly (Solingen 2009: 34). The issue of foreign workers and their impact on the social life 
in these countries was widely discussed and the great amount of foreign workers was 
(and is) negatively perceived by many citizens (Wiese 2012: 217). These problems, in 
combination with economic mismanagement and endemic corruption in the public sec-
tor, resulted in increasing public dissatisfaction with inept governance. These discon-
tents found its expression inter alia in protests: “Political protest and opposition to the 
spending policies and rampant corruption […] was manifest in a series of workers’ pro-
tests throughout the decade” (Milton-Edwards 2006: 87). The 1990s also saw the rise 
of mainly Islamist oppositional forces, challenging the legitimacy of the regimes (Najem 
2003: 14). The reflection of this internal crisis at the international level can be seen 
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inter alia when having a look at the amount of FDI. Throughout the 1990s the level of 
FDI was very low compared to the level of the 1980s (Solingen 2009: 60). Apparently 
responding to this shared crisis of legitimacy, the Gulf rulers started to engage in gov-
ernance transfer from 1997 onwards. The following analysis shows that the GCC has 
prescribed and promoted governance standards in the area of environment (1997), 




The most relevant document in the area of environment in which the GCC prescribes 
standards for legitimate governance institutions is the document “General Regulations 
of Environment in the GCC States”. The regulations have been agreed upon by the 
Ministerial Council consisting of the ministers responsible for environmental affairs (au-
thorized by the Supreme Council) in 1996 and have come into force in 1997 (GCC 
1997: unpaginated). In these regulations, the Ministerial Council addresses the relevant 
public bodies in the member states, meaning “any ministry, department or governmen-
tal or semi-governmental agency” (GCC 1997: unpaginated) that is responsible for en-
vironmental issues. The prescribed objectives deal with the application of environmen-
tal standards, assessment and monitoring and with the use of technologies and re-
sources. With reference to standards, assessment and monitoring the GCC prescribes 
the following objectives:  
 
a)  “Environmental considerations should be taken into consideration and given 
foremost priorities. These priorities should be merged with all stages and levels 
of planning so as to make environmental planning an integral part of the com-
prehensive development planning in all industrial, agricultural, constructional 
and other fields […]”; “loans for projects”;  
b)  “Monitoring the application of the environmental regulations and stand-
ards and compliance with them on their own projects or projects their super-
vision or licensed by them and preparing periodic report about their effec-
tiveness and the extent of compliance to them”;  
c)  “Environmental assessment of projects should be adopted and environmental 
assessment studies should be included in the feasibility studies. The licensing 
of projects and facilities with the agreement of the concerned authority should 
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be linked to the environment protection in the light of the result of such studies” 
(GCC 1997: unpaginated, own emphasis). 
 
The prescribed standards refer to juridification, sustainability, transparency and effec-
tiveness. 
With regards to the use of best technologies and the use of resources the following 
standards are prescribed: 
 
a)  “All new facilities and projects and any major change in an existing project 
should use the best available technologies to control pollution and prevent 
environmental deterioration”;  
b)  “Technologies in use should be reconsidered so as to be more compatible 
with the environment. The importance of revival and development of suitable 
traditional technologies should be emphasized within this framework”;  
c)  “The licensing authority should make sure that new projects and major altera-
tions to existing projects use the best available technology for control of 
pollution and prevention of environmental deterioration”;  
d)  “Within the context of sustainable development, all public bodies, each within 
its competence should endeavor to rationalize the use of natural resources, 
living or non-living to conserve and develop the renewable resources, and to 
extend the lifetime of the non-renewable resources for the benefit of the pre-
sent and future generations. This includes preparation, development and ap-
plication of appropriate regulations to realize coordination between the pat-
terns and rates of utilization of the recycling and re-use technologies and 
conservation of energy and development of the traditional technologies and 
regulations which are compatible with the local and regional environments” 
(GCC 1997: unpaginated, own emphasis). 
 
The prescribed standards refer to juridification, sustainability and efficiency. 
The GCC neither specifies strategic guidelines for governance transfer nor does it have 
a policy for promoting standards for legitimate governance institutions. The member 
states are free to formulate their own policies on the basis of the standards prescribed. 
The framework regulation represents the “minimum basics required for preparing and 
developing similar national legislations in the member states” (GCC 1997: 
unpaginated). In the regulations, an ultimate goal of the promoted standards is stated: 
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It is pointed out that sound economic development and a healthy environment are 
closely linked and that further economic growth, as essential basis for providing output 
legitimacy, is only possible if environmental considerations are taken into account and 
if the public bodies comply with the standards. No instruments to induce compliance 
are foreseen in the document. However, there is one ad hoc measure, which has been 
found in an article about energy policies in the Gulf (Reiche 2010) and by analyzing 
different Gulf newspapers, available online: the “environment week”. This measure can 
be subsumed under the instrument of dialogue and exchange. The “environment week” 
is “part of efforts by GCC countries to coordinate environment protection measures, 
including regulations and environment legislations in Gulf countries” (Oman Tribune 
2012). It is organized by the Secretary General and is held every February (Reiche 
2010: 6). In 2007, the Supreme Council of the GCC has also adopted the “Green Envi-
ronment Initiative” with the aim “to upgrade the efficiency and performance of environ-
mental institutions in GCC countries to protect environment and natural resources” 
(Gulf News 2007). Unfortunately, neither by searching on the homepage of the GCC 
nor by searching with different internet search engines, any further information about 
this initiative has been obtained.  
In theory, the Secretariat General is responsible for monitoring implementation of the 
proposed standards. There is an environmental coordination unit within the Secretariat 
General which is supposed to support individual GCC countries in implementing their 
environmental policies (Reiche 2010: 6). However, the Secretariat General lacks any 
autonomy or means to enforce compliance (Legrenzi 2011: 38). As additional instru-
ment it can be mentioned that the Supreme Council sometimes calls upon the member 
states to comply with prescribed standards (for instance, GCC 2004). 
The GCC has prescribed standards for legitimate governance institutions in the policy 
field of environment referring to efficiency, sustainability, juridification, transparency 
and effectiveness. It has not adopted specific policies to promote these standards. With 
the “environmental week” (and presumably since 2007 also the “Green Environment 
Initiative”) the GCC offers fora for exchange and dialogue with which it seeks to induce 
compliance. These instruments have apparently been introduced a few years after the 
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4.3. Population/Employment 
 
The most relevant document in which the GCC prescribes standards for legitimate 
governance institutions is the “General Framework of the Population Strategy for the 
GCC Member States” (GCC 1998a). The document has been prepared by the Secre-
tary General and its “competent committees” and has been adopted by the Supreme 
Council in 1998 (GCC 1998a: unpaginated). In this document, the Secretary General 
and its “competent committees” (in the name of the heads of the member states) ad-
dress the member states’ responsible ministries. These are the institutions which are 
supposed to implement the prescribed standards. The prescribed standards deal with 
the recruitment of workers (foreign and national) and statistics and surveys which shall 
be conducted in the area of population. 
With regards to recruitment, the GCC prescribes the following standards:  
 
a)  “Efficient organization of recruitment of foreign workers";  
b)  “Optimum utilization of the Gulf work force”;  
c)  “Rationalizing and controlling the recruitment of household workers and 
evolving appropriate mechanism to do away with illegal workers in the GCC 
States”;  
d)  “Recruitment of immigrant workers in accordance with specific standards on 
the basis of age ensuring employment of manpower in jobs commensurate with 
age”;  
e)  “Recruitment of foreign work force in accordance with legal standards – both 
quantitatively and qualitatively – based on real needs and in consonance with 
the demands of development, social stability and demographic homogeneity” 
(GCC 1998a: unpaginated, own emphasis). 
 
These prescribed standards refer to efficiency, sustainability, effectiveness and 
juridification.  
With regards to surveys and statistics about population matters the GCC prescribes the 
following standards:  
 
a)  “Developing population statistics and compiling data on the job market and rais-
ing the level of its accuracy and comprehensiveness and to update it on a 
regular basis and make uniform the statistics related definitions and meaning”;  
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b)  “Conducting population census, demographic surveys and analytical studies on 
a regular basis and publishing their results” (GCC 1998a: unpaginated, own 
emphasis). 
 
These prescribed standards all refer to transparency and efficiency. 
The GCC neither specifies strategic guidelines for governance transfer nor does it have 
a policy for promoting standards of legitimate governance institutions. The member 
states are free to formulate their own policies and population strategies on basis of the 
standards prescribed in the framework (GCC 1998a: unpaginated). However, the GCC 
specifies an ultimate goal: ensuring economic development and homogeneity of the 
Gulf society while “affirming its Islamic and Arab identity” (GCC 1998a: unpaginated), 
to maintain stability and cohesiveness and to increase the level of economic participa-
tion of their citizens (GCC 1998a: unpaginated).  
In terms of instruments the document foresees regular fora for exchange and dialogue: 
“Regular meetings of the representatives of the GCC shall be held every three years to 
discuss the population situation, policies and achievements” (GCC 1998a: 
unpaginated).  
The suggested instrument is implemented in practice: Since 2001, meetings of the na-
tional Permanent Population Committees (PPCs) take place at the Secretariat General 
in Riyadh, Saudi-Arabia. At these meetings the different national PPCs discuss togeth-
er in how far they have implemented the standards set in the general framework (Qata-
ri PPC 2012).15 The meetings do not take place every three years, as suggested in the 
general framework, but are held annually. According to the Qatari Population Commit-
tee’s homepage the national PPC consists of representatives from government agen-
cies and non-governmental organizations dealing with population issues in Qatar. Next 
to representatives of different ministries they mention representatives of Qatar Petrole-
um and the Qatar Chamber of Commerce and Industry as non-governmental actors 
(Qatari PPC 2012). However, close relations exist between business and ruling elites in 
the Gulf states. In the case of Qatar in particular, the ruling Al Thani family holds the 
                                               
 
15
  Please note that no matter which homepage of the Qatari PPC you open, always the same link ap-
pears. 
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chairmanship and other prominent positions of the Qatar Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry (Mitchell 2010: 287).16 
The last meeting of PPCs has taken place in October 2011:  
 
“The present annual meeting dealt with the follow up of the general framework 
draft development for the population strategy and the design of population data 
questionnaire of GCC countries” (Qatari PPC 2012, own emphasis). 
 
Apparently these meetings have the purpose to provide a forum for exchange and dia-
logue. The Secretariat General tries to support the member states in complying with 
the normative standards as prescribed in the general framework.  
The GCC has prescribed standards for legitimate governance institutions in the policy 
field of population/employment referring to efficiency, sustainability, juridification, trans-
parency and effectiveness. It has not adopted specific policies to promote these stand-
ards. But with the PPC meetings the GCC’s Secretariat General applies a measure to 
facilitate compliance with the standards by bringing together different (mainly) govern-
mental actors. At these meetings they can exchange their views and potentially a trans-




Cooperation in the field of education is very central among the GCC states and can be 
traced back to the time before the foundation of the GCC (GCC 2007). The most im-
portant document with regards to governance transfer is the document “Comprehen-
sive Development of Education”, which is “an implementation of the Supreme Council 
resolution in its twenty-third (23) session (Doha, December 2002)” (GCC 2002). The 
objectives and standards promoted deal with the organization, administration and eval-
uation of educational institutions, as provider of the public good education: 
 
a)  “[…] need for educational systems to […] adopt global standards in evaluat-
ing the output of education while, at the same time preserving the Arab and Is-
lamic identity […]”; 
                                               
 
16
  However, Mitchell emphasizes that research on the business communities in the Gulf shows, that the 
grip of the rulers on economic opportunities is weakening, an independent bourgeoisie is emerging 
and that these actors engage in a discourse of reform (2010: 285-286). 
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b)  “effective organizational development to ameliorate the performance of the 
educational institution and to achieve the criteria of quality”;  
c)  “keeping pace on the part of educational institution with technological and sci-
entific advancement especially in the field of information and communication 
technology, and making use of technological applications and scientific re-
search in the educational and administrative fields”;  
d)  “[…] system of supervision, monitoring, and accountability in the education-
al systems especially in the field of teachers’ performance”;  
e)  “adoption of sophisticated methods in organizational development in education-
al institutions, for the realization of effectiveness and efficiency, ameliorating 
performance level, establishing rules of the organizational relation with the cen-
tral authority ad (sic!) local educational authorities, including the executive direc-
torate on school level or its counterpart in university education, and allowing the 
application of the concept of accountability”;  
f)  “[…] sophisticated administrative models which effectively and efficiently real-
ize the educational objectives and lead to the ideal use of human and financial 
resources in the educational institutions” (GCC 2002: unpaginated, own em-
phasis). 
 
The prescribed standards are efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, transparency, 
juridification and sustainability. With regards to juridification it is interesting that the 
GCC refers to “global standards”, thus slightly extending the otherwise narrow concept 
of juridification, which does not specify any content of the legal regulation. 
As in the other policy fields, the GCC applies the instrument of offering fora for ex-
change and dialogue. Different formats are suggested in the document “Comprehen-
sive Development of Education” (GCC 2002). The first program mentioned is the pro-
gram for educational process development and addresses the relevant units of the na-
tional ministries of education. The second section deals with education professionaliza-
tion and addresses ministries of education and higher education institutes themselves. 
Development of administrative and organizational performance is the subject of a pro-
gram which aims at the development and improvement of administration of educational 
institutions. The project of partnership between education institutions and society tries 
to activate joint institutional action between actors from the business and education 
sector. Additionally universities and research institutes have been called into consulting 
committees (GCC 2002). There is no information available on the GCC’s homepage, 
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however a separate research in media of the Gulf indicates that some of these com-
mission meetings are actually taking place (for example Dubib 2012). These meetings 
in different commission offer national ministries and educational institutions fora for 
exchange and dialogue. 
 
 
5.   Discussion 
 
The following table provides an overview of governance transfer by the GCC. It sum-
marizes the results of the analysis set out above, which I will discuss in this chapter. 
 
Overview of governance transfer by the GCC 
     Stand-
ards  














































No governance transfer 
Additionally no governance transfer in : Statistics, Agriculture/Fishery, Health; Patent; Youth/Sports;  
Forests/Wildlife, Transport and Communication 
Security  
No documents available  
Additionally no documents are available for: Media, Health, Water and Electricity, Arts/Culture¸ Petroleum and Energy 
Standard prescribed = green; Standard not prescribed = red 
 
 
Hypothesis 1: As the empirical results suggest, the first instance of governance trans-
fer  can be found in the field of environment in 1997 and in other fields in the following 
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years. 17 The 1990s have been characterized by a crisis of legitimacy indicated by de-
clining rents, increasing unemployment, problems in the education sector, a high num-
ber of foreign workers, protests and uprisings as well as a low level of FDIs, pointing to 
external consequences of the perceived instability. 
As described in the second chapter, the GCC has also been founded as a reaction to a 
crisis of legitimacy. However, as proposed in the first hypothesis only a crisis of legiti-
macy with regards to their “main” source of legitimacy induced the leaders to adopt 
reforms at a national level and also to allow interference in their governance structures 
by developing common standards for legitimate governance institutions at the regional 
level. The crisis of traditional legitimacy at the end of the 1970s/at the beginning of the 
1980s (chapter 2.2.) has not been a sufficient condition for the GCC states to engage 
in governance transfer.  
 
 crisis of legitimacy regional strategy 
t0: 
1981 
crisis of traditional/ 
religious legitimacy 
cooperation in internal secu-








(Source: own compilation) 
 
 
Hypotheses 2 and 3: The GCC states have started to engage in governance transfer 
in the policy fields of education, population/employment and environment. These are 
areas in which the GCC member states have faced great problems, in which a lack of 
effectiveness and capability of the political and economic system has become most 
apparent (chapter 2.1.). They are also the ones in which the rulers can convey the im-
pression towards their citizenry and international investors that they are actually trying 
to solve the crisis and the causes of the crisis, without endangering the political status 
quo and vested interests of the ruling families. This can also explain why governance 
transfer is not taking place in one central field of cooperation – the area of economy. In 
all states except for Kuwait it is still very difficult to distinguish between the ruling family 
and state interests (Legrenzi 2008: 111). The state is most powerful in the field of 
                                               
 
17
  It can be assumed that there have been discussions or considerations before 1997. However, as there 
are no documents available which give more information about the decision-making process among 
the GCC states, it is not possible to find out in how far governance transfer has been an issue before. 
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economy, it controls all or the most valuable sectors and companies. The huge ruling 
families make their living from the exploitation of state resources and are dependent on 
the control of oil rents (Niethammer 2011: 16). Taken together with different national 
economic structures and interests (Holthaus 2010: 65), this can explain why no com-
mon governance standards have been prescribed or promoted, as this would have 
interfered with the sovereignty and interests of the ruling families. 
For the area of security, no documents are available in English. In the literature a “GCC 
Counter-Terrorism Agreement” is mentioned, which has been adopted in 2004 (GCC 
2009: 35-36; Holthaus 2010: 73), but could not been found on the GCC’s homepage. 
This lack of available data is an important constraint for the results of this paper. I 
would argue that no governance transfer is taking place in the area of security as it is 
the sphere “most closely associated with sovereignty” (Legrenzi 2008: 111). Coopera-
tion and exchange among intelligence agencies or ministries of interior in these fields 
can be beneficial. Having common standards for legitimate governance institutions, on 
the contrary, would rather endanger vested interests and seriously interfere with the 
sovereignty of the regimes. However, this cannot be verified empirically. No documents 
are furthermore available for Media, Health, Water and Electricity, Arts/Culture¸ Petro-
leum and Energy. Other fields in which governance transfer is not taking place are Sta-
tistics, Agriculture/Fishery, Health, Patent, Youth/Sports, Forests/Wildlife, Transport 
and Communication.18 These are no fields in which a lack of effectiveness and capabil-
ity of the political and economic system has become apparent. 
While the fields of education and population are important with regards to both – inter-
nal and external - audiences, I argue that governance transfer in the area of environ-
ment mainly targets international actors. The member states of the GCC face many 
environmental challenges like water scarcity, land degradation and desertification, and 
pollution related to the oil and gas industry (Raouf 2011). These developments definite-
ly had (and have) effects on the population. Yet, it is questionable, whether they direct-
ly connect this with the perception of an ineffectiveness of the system. It can be argued 
that the GCC mainly aims at attracting foreign investments when engaging in govern-
ance transfer in the area of environment. This would also explain why they prescribed 
the standard of sustainability as an additional good governance standard.  
 
                                               
 
18
  http://sites.gcc-sg.org/DLibrary/index-eng.php?action=Subject; last access 20.2.2013. 
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The standards encompass all norms of good governance (efficiency, effectiveness, 
transparency, accountability). Additionally the GCC prescribes the standards of 
juridification and sustainability, which can be grouped under the concept of good gov-
ernance as well. All in all, there is little variation within the fields. 
One interesting result with regards to the promoted standards can be stated in the field 
of education. First of all, the standard of accountability is mentioned here. Accountabil-
ity implies that state action should be answerable and that state officials are responsi-
ble for their actions (Börzel et al. 2011: 7). Even though this standard addresses edu-
cational institutions and not the ruling families and therefore does not endanger their 
position of power, it is nevertheless interesting that they prescribe this standard as it 
could – if applied in other areas – undermine the rulers’ interests and power. 
A second interesting point with regards to the standards is a reference to “global 
standards” in the area of education, thereby slightly extending the analytical category of 
juridification, which has been defined as a norm not mentioning any content. This again 
supports the argument, that the regimes explicitly do not only aim at its domestic audi-
ences, but increasingly (education as the latest instance of governance transfer) also at 
international actors, which regularly complain that the Gulf’s youth is not adequately 
educated to be employed in the private sector (Wiese 2012: 216). Due to the limited 
scope of this paper changes over time with regards to governance transfer cannot be 
considered in detail and are not in the focus of this analysis. However, this result sug-
gests that changes over time have taken place. 
A final important result can be found in the area of education as well as in the area of 
population: one of the objectives in the field of education states the “need for educa-
tional systems to […] adopt global standards […], at the same time preserving the 
Arab and Islamic identity […]”  (GCC 2002: unpaginated, own emphasis). In the area 
of population they also refer to the importance of “affirming […] Islamic and Arab 
identity” (GCC 1998a: unpaginated, own emphasis). This points to a dilemma, the 
regimes actually face and which has not been considered in this paper so far: With 
regards to reforms at a national level Najem argues that the regimes have to “reorient 
or reinvent themselves [...], generally with reference to both externally and internally 
derived ideological poles” (Najem 2003: 5). While most authors emphasize the im-
portance of material legitimacy, this result points to the fact that the Gulf rulers appar-
ently also perceive religion and tradition, the two other sources of legitimacy of their 
rule (Weiffen 2008: 2588; Albrecht/ Schlumberger 2004: 377), as important. Apparent-
ly, there are also demands among certain segments of the population to adhere to Is-
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lamic law or values (Najem 2003: 12-13). Additionally, the main oppositional move-
ments in the Gulf states consist of Islamist movements, questioning the legitimacy of 
their ruling and their religious and traditional justification (Holthaus 2010: 35). These 
factors can explain why the rulers make Islamic or Arab references when prescribing 
standards for legitimate governance institutions. 
 
Hypothesis 4: As expected, the GCC mainly engages in the prescription of govern-
ance transfer and if it promotes standards it exclusively applies the “soft” instrument of 
“exchange and dialogue”. Generally, the GCC has only started to apply instruments a 
few years after it has prescribed the standards.  
 
 
6.  Conclusion 
 
The findings of this paper suggest that the GCC has resorted to governance transfer as 
a strategy of legitimation facing a crisis of legitimacy. The rulers of the Gulf have tried 
to sustain their legitimacy by endorsing standards of good governance – targeting their 
respective citizenry but also using governance transfer as a signaling mechanism to-
wards external actors, by publicly committing themselves to certain standards these 
external investors care about. This result supports the theoretical assumptions by 
Börzel et al. (2013): They have conceptualized governance transfer as the institutional 
choice of member state governments (Koremonos et al. 2001, cited in Börzel et al.: 
2013: 23). The wish by authoritarian regimes to bolster the legitimacy of their ruling has 
been identified as an important demand factor which can explain why and how ROs 
engage in governance transfer and has been confirmed in works about other authori-
tarian regimes (Levitsky/Way 2010; Söderbaum 2004) as well as organizations of au-
thoritarian regimes, such as the Arab League or the Shanghai Cooperation Organiza-
tion (Schneider 2013; van Hüllen forthcoming). 
The assumption that governance transfer is used as a strategy of legitimation is re-
flected in the way how the Gulf states have engaged in governance transfer: Standards 
have been prescribed and promoted in those fields in which problems of their govern-
ance institutions have become most apparent. Furthermore, they have referred to cer-
tain norms of good governance trying to convey to the populations of the Gulf as well 
as to international actors that they are actively trying to solve the problems, which have 
caused their shared crisis of legitimacy. This result is in line with findings by Börzel/van 
   31 
Hüllen/Lohaus (2013): ROs are not following a “global script”, their adoption of govern-
ance standards is rather “localized” (Acharya 2004, cited in Börzel et al. 2013: 5). “ROs 
choose from a menu of standards and instruments rather than simply ‘downloading’ the 
whole package” (Börzel et al. 2013: 5).  
At the same time, the way how the GCC engages in governance transfer also reflects 
the authoritarian regimes’ concerns about their position of power, their families’ vested 
interests and a threat to the political status quo. The result of these concerns might be 
that governance transfer by the GCC does not serve as an effective means to improve 
member states’ governance institutions and thus to support the solution of problems in 
certain policy fields. Rather, governance transfer as a strategy of legitimation could be 
characterized as a “survival strategy”, which does not make governance institutions 
substantially more effective. To find out, further analysis, tracing the potential impact of 
governance transfer in the states of the GCC, is necessary. Yet, some empirical obser-
vations indicate that the rulers have apparently been “pushed further” than they intend-
ed to: As described, they have for example prescribed the normative standard of “ac-
countability”, which is rather surprising as it contradicts the idea of a “survival strategy”. 
Important limitations of this paper have to be mentioned: Firstly, the conclusions have 
to be drawn with caution. In many instances it is very difficult to find information or data 
about the GCC’s practices, especially as many documents are only available in Arabic. 
This seriously constrains the explanatory power of this paper. Additionally, it is very 
difficult to gain information with regards to the instruments applied. Secondly, this pa-
per has focused on the questions under which conditions the GCC has started to en-
gage in governance transfer and how it engages in governance transfer, while changes 
over time have not been analyzed in detail. Besides, I have not taken into account de-
velopments which are currently taking place at a prescriptive level: For example there 
is apparently a joint human rights declaration being discussed at the GCC level (Kuwait 
News Agency 2012).  
In the end, the particularities of the GCC as stated in the introduction – its member 
states’ authoritarian character, its lack of autonomous supranational institutions, the 
non-intervention-clause and the emphasis of sovereignty – do not prevent the GCC 
from engaging in governance transfer. Similar to the SCO or the LAS, the GCC is a 
least likely case which nevertheless engages in governance transfer. Its authoritarian 
characteristics only strongly influence the way how the GCC engages in governance 
transfer. 
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Important transformations are taking place in the Gulf and the economic and socioeco-
nomic problems already apparent in the 1990s have aggravated (Niethammer 2011: 
14). In 2011, protests have taken place in all of the Gulf countries except for Qatar 
(Niethammer 2011: 14), pointing to a serious crisis of legitimacy. These developments 
and the discussion on a joint human rights declaration suggest that the GCC states will 
further engage in governance transfer, maybe extending the prescription of standards 
to other concepts such as human rights or the rule of law. It is unlikely that these 
measures will help to solve the crisis of legitimacy – they will probably take the shape 
of “survival strategies” and not appease the demands by many of the protestors and 
opposition movements in the Gulf monarchies. 
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